Homework 2: Caught in the Web

Due: Thursday, March 14 @ 11:59 pm EST

Overview and instructions

This homework has 3 problems. All students must complete all problems; there is no extra component for CS1620/CS2660 students (good luck on Bob’s Router!).

Note on collaboration

You are welcome (and encouraged!) to collaborate with your peers, but the solutions you write down must be your own work (ie, written by you). You are responsible for independently understanding all work that you submit—after discussing a problem as a group, you should ensure that you are able to produce your own answers independently to ensure that you understand the problem. For more information, please see the course Collaboration Policy.

In your submission, we ask that you include a brief collaboration statement describing how you collaborated with others on each problem—see the next section for details.

How to submit

You will submit your work in PDF form on Gradescope to the assignment labeled “HW2”. Your PDF should conform to the following requirements:

• Do not include any identifying information (name, CS username, Banner ID, etc.) in your PDF, since all homeworks are graded anonymously

• Each problem should start on a separate page. When you submit on Gradescope, you will be asked to mark which pages correspond to which problem

• At the start of each problem, write a brief collaboration statement that lists the names and CS usernames of anyone you collaborated with and what ideas you discussed together

• If you consulted any outside resources while answering any question, you should cite them with your answer
Problem 1: Cookies at Blue University

(15 pts) Blue University runs a web server at blue.university, where it hosts different pages for students and courses. Here’s what you know about it:

1. Each student and staff member can upload web pages to a directory on the webserver to host a personal website. For example, user alice can upload any files to the server and make them available at http://blue.university/people/alice/

2. The webserver is pretty old, and allows users to view pages using both HTTP and HTTPS, i.e. at http://blue.university and https://blue.university, respectively. Data sent via HTTPS is encrypted in transit, whereas HTTP is a plaintext protocol.

In addition, the cs666 course staff have implemented an assignment submission system at http://blue.university/courses/cs666/submissions. Students taking cs666 provide an email and password to log in to the submission site. The website then issues authenticated users a cookie which contains a session ID that allows the user to authenticate themselves without having to type in their password again for 24 hours. You view the cookie in your browser and it looks like this:

Name: sessionid
Value: [random session ID...]
Domain: blue.university
SameSite: Strict

Based on what you know about the Blue University website and the new cs666 submission system, consider the following questions. For each part, your answer should be no more than 1–2 sentences.

Part a) Bob is a cs666 staff member. Eve manages to eavesdrop on Bob’s network connection while Bob visits the site at http://blue.university/courses/cs666/submissions. Can Eve acquire Bob’s sessionid cookie for the submission system? Explain why/why not.

Part b) Alice can create a custom personal webpage at the path http://blue.university/users/alice/, but cannot change anything else on the blue.university webserver. Can Alice acquire Bob’s sessionid cookie for the submission system? If so, outline how Alice might set up her webpage to steal the cookie; if not, explain why.

Part c) The Blue University administrators now consider various modifications to the site’s cookie scheme:

(i) Suppose the administrators add the Secure:TRUE property to the cookie. First, identify what Bob has to change in the way he visits the submission site. Then, answer: does this change any of your answers to part (a) or part (b)? Why or why not.

(ii) Suppose the University adds the HttpOnly:TRUE property to the cookie instead of the Secure property. Does this change any of your answers to part (a) or part (b)? Explain.

Hint: For a concise description of these cookie attributes, we recommend this link: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Cookies You can also find information in lectures 7–11.

Part d) For this part, consider Alice, the adversary from part (b), and ignore the modifications made to the cookie scheme in part (c).

(i) Suppose the administrators change the URL of the submission system to cs666.blue.university/handin and change the Domain property of the cookie to cs666.blue.university. Does this change your answer to part (b)? Explain.

(ii) Suppose the University decides to keep the domain of the system as blue.university (and keeps the Domain:blue.university property). Instead, they decide to put each users page on its own subdomain—for instance, Alice’s user page is now located at alice.blue.university. Does this change your answer to part (b)? Explain.

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1We’ll learn more about HTTPS/TLS in a few lectures—for now, this is all we need to know about it.
Sample TA Solution

a) (3 pts) Eve can acquire the cookie. Bob is visiting the site using http, not https; as such, the network data to the website is sent unencrypted. A passive network attacker (like Eve) can then simply sniff the cookie data when Bob makes a request since the data is not encrypted.

• 3/3 pts: Full credit: recognizes plain HTTP means unencrypted and data will be transmitted in the clear
• 2/3 points: Correct intuition, but something important missing
• 1/3 points: Incorrect intuition, major components missing
• 0/3 points: No credit/missing

b) (4 pts) Alice can acquire the cookie. Requirements:

• Why it works: The same-origin policy permits the same domain to access the same domain’s cookies. As such, Alice can place some Javascript at http://blue.university/staff/alice/ that simply reads from document.cookie and sends the cookie data to an endpoint she controls.

• How the attack could work: One of the attacker models in web application security is that we can assume that the web attacker can get a user to visit a particular website (perhaps either by a phishing attack, or social engineering, etc.). Alice and Bob are both staff members for Blue University, and therefore it’s certainly within the realm of possibility that Alice could convince Bob to view his web page.

• 4/4 pts: Full credit: recognizes Alice’s page is in same-origin as rest of site, discusses attack where Alice gets Bob to visit a page that Alice can control.
• 3/4 points: Correct intuition, but something important missing
• 2/4 points: Correct intuition, but multiple important things missing
• 1/4 points: Incorrect intuition, major components missing
• 0/4 points: No credit/missing

c) (i) (4 pts) Bob has to now visit the page via https, since the Secure:TRUE property means that the cookies are only transmitted via an https connection.

This changes the answer to part (a). Since Bob now must use https, Eve can no longer sniff the network connection for the cookie since it is sent encrypted. However, this does not change the answer to part (b). Alice can just make Bob visit her webpage via https://blue.university/staff/alice/ (as opposed to the http version) and perform the same Javascript-based cookie extraction attack described in part (b).

• Graded on same 4pt scale as above. For full credit, must explain what Secure:TRUE does and how it applies to both parts.

(ii) (4 pts) This changes the answer to sub-part (b) but not subpart (a).

The naming of the HttpOnly property is a little misleading—while the HttpOnly:TRUE property suggests that the cookie must be sent via an http (as opposed to https connection), what it actually means is that the cookie can only be accessed via an HTTP request (as opposed to Javascript). This means that scripts (like the Javascript described in the attack for part (b)) cannot access the contents of the cookie via the document.cookie variable.

This implication changes Alice’s abilities as an attacker. Alice is no longer able to extract Bob’s session cookie, even if she can convince Bob to visit her webpage, since her attack relies on accessing the cookie via Javascript. However, this doesn’t change Alice’s abilities as an attacker, as long as Bob visits the submission site via http—even with HttpOnly, the cookie will still be sent in the clear and Alice will be able to sniff it from the network.
d) (i) (4 pts) The URL change to cs166.blue.university blocks Alice’s attack. Due to the same-origin policy, cookies set for cs166.blue.university cannot be read by blue.university because these two domain names are not considered to be same-origin. This means that the Javascript document.cookie variable will not contain Bob’s sessionid cookie if he visits Alice’s staff webpage.

   • Graded on same 4pt scale as above. For full credit, must explain what Secure:TRUE does and how it applies to both parts.

(ii) (4 pts) The Domain attribute specifies allowed hosts to receive the cookie. If Domain is specified (like it is in this updated scheme), then subdomains are always included in the cookie scope. As such, the subdomain change for the staff pages do not block Alice’s attack. The same-origin policy allows for cookies set on blue.university to be read by alice.blue.university, and as such the Javascript document.cookie variable will contain Bob’s sessionid cookie if she visits John’s staff webpage.

   • Graded on same 4pt scale as above. For full credit, must explain what how the URL change and Domain attribute affects same-origin policy and relate it to part (b).
Problem 2: Getting more from markdown

You are on the engineering team for a company that builds an web application for writing documentation: users write documentation in markdown (a lightweight text markup language), which your application renders as a fancy, publicly-viewable webpage.

Consider the following questions about ways to extend your applications. For each part, your answers should be no more than 1–2 sentences.

**Part a)** Your users are constantly submitting feature requests for new and more expressive ways to write markdown. In a meeting, your company’s customer experience team gives a report on these feature requests and suggests two new features for your team to implement:

(i) New syntax to highlight super-important text in red, which would generate HTML like this:

\[
\text{<span style="color:red">markdown from user here</span>}
\]

(ii) New tags to let users add some of their own Javascript and CSS styling so they can format their own text, freeing your team from needing to write features like (i) ever again!

As someone who has a background in web security, how would you respond? Based on what you’ve learned about in this class, which feature(s) would you feel comfortable adding to your app from a security standpoint?

More concretely: In 1–2 sentences, pick which feature(s) are problematic explain your reasoning by stating the potential risks and the amount of work that might be required to implement them safely. Write your response as if you were talking to your coworkers in a meeting: to be most effective, it should be concise, polite, and targeted to an audience with only a general CS background—not everyone has the security knowledge you do!

(i) has limited risk since it just wraps existing markdown with extra formatting. (ii) has a significant risk of introducing XSS attacks: allowing users to write their own JS means they could modify the page or potentially steal user’s info. While it may be possible to allow only a limited set of script features or tags, this would be very difficult to get right.

**Part b)** Say your team is tasked with implementing feature (i) from part (a) and investigates how to actually make the changes. Your app relies on a popular, open-source library called libmarkstuff that parses the markdown and outputs HTML. It turns out that in order to implement feature (i), you would need to modify the code for libmarkstuff, rather than your own application’s code. To resolve this, your coworker suggests making a private fork of the libmarkstuff repository that includes your custom feature (and any other features you might add later).

Does this add to the risk level for implementing the feature? Explain why or why not.

This is potentially more risky since we’d need to maintain a separate fork of the library—when the library gets security updates, we’d need to update our library in sync, and make sure our changes are still compatible.

An alternative strategy would be to attempt to get your feature accepted by libmarkstuff upstream, which would avoid needing to maintain a separate fork.
Problem 3: Tracking without cookies

While many sites use cookies to track users and store information about their browsing habits, there exist other techniques that are not as easy to detect and counter by the user.

Consider the following questions—for each part, your answer should be no more than 1–2 sentences.

Part a) A classic non-cookie tracking technique is to use a tracking pixel, where websites embed a tiny 1x1 pixel image from an analytics service in their webpages. How could this image alone be used to track users across different websites?

Even without cookies, any request for an image can be detected/logged by the serving site, so the analytics service would know that the image was fetched. While it may or may not be possible to determine the identity of a specific user (eg. they may or may not have cookies from the analytics service), the service could still know, eg. how many requests were being received from a specific page.

Part b) In modern times, browser fingerprinting is a broad class of strategies for sites to gather various information about a user’s browser to uniquely identify a specific user, allowing sites to target ads and track individual users without ever storing any cookies. In this problem, you’ll view your own browser fingerprint! To do this:

• In an Incognito/Private Browsing window, go to [https://amiunique.org](https://amiunique.org) and click “View Fingerprint.” This page runs several tests using Javascript to gather information about your browser and the features it supports, combining them into a unique fingerprint.

• Look over the various data used to generate your fingerprint. For each feature, the report shows the percentage of users that share the same value for that feature. Scroll through the features and list three features with low similarity scores that you found interesting or surprising. (For more info on each feature, click the “i” button on the left.)

• In a sentence or two, consider: why do browsers have this much identifiable information? Is there anything you might be able to do to avoid having a unique fingerprint? (There are no correct answers here; we’re just looking for something thoughtful.)

Answers will vary—graded on completion.