

<https://brown-csci1660.github.io>

CS1660: Intro to Computer Systems Security Spring 2025

Lecture 13: OS I

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March 11, 2025



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
CS1660: Announcements

- ◆ Course updates
 - ◆ Project 2 is due Thursday, March 13
 - ◆ Homework 2 is now out and due Tuesday, March 18
 - ◆ Where we are
 - ◆ **Part I: Crypto**
 - ◆ **Part II: Web** (with demos coming soon)
 - ◆ **Part III: OS**
 - ◆ Part IV: Network
 - ◆ Part V: Extras



Today


- ◆ OS security




Source: XKCD

Access control

Access control (AC)



General structure of access control mechanism




Basic terminology

- ◆ Subject/Principal
 - ◆ active entity – user or process
- ◆ Object
 - ◆ passive entity – file or resource
- ◆ Access operations
 - ◆ vary from basic memory access (read, write) to method calls in object-oriented systems
 - ◆ comparable systems may use different access operations or attach different meanings to operations which appear to be the same

Access operation

- ◆ Access right
 - ◆ right to perform an (access) operation
- ◆ Permission
 - ◆ typically a synonym for access right
- ◆ Privilege
 - ◆ typically a set of access rights given directly to roles like administrator, operator, ...

Authentication



- ◆ reference monitor verifies the identity of the principal making the request
 - ◆ a user identity is one example for a principal
 - ◆ cf. authentication Vs. identification


Authentication

- ◆ user enters username and password
- ◆ if the values entered are correct, the user is “authenticated”
- ◆ we could say: “The machine now runs on behalf of the user”
 - ◆ this might be intuitive, but it is imprecise
- ◆ log on creates a process that “runs with access rights” assigned to the user
 - ◆ the process runs under the user identity of the user who has logged on

Users & user identities

- ◆ requests to reference monitor do not come directly from a user or a user identity, but from a process
- ◆ in the language of access control, the process “speaks for” the user (identity)
- ◆ the active entity making a request within the system is called the subject
- ◆ must distinguish between three concepts
 - ◆ user: person
 - ◆ principal: identity (e.g., user name) used in the system, possibly associated with a user
 - ◆ subject: process running under a given user identity

Authorization




- ◆ reference monitor decides whether access is granted or denied
- ◆ has to find and evaluate the security policy relevant for the given request
- ◆ “easy” in centralized systems; in distributed systems,
 - ◆ how to find all relevant policies? how to make decisions if policies may be missing?

Principals & subjects

- ◆ a principal is an entity that can be granted access to objects or can make statements affecting access control decisions
 - ◆ example: user ID
- ◆ subjects operate on behalf of (human users we call) principals
- ◆ access is based on the principal's name bound to the subject in some unforgeable manner at authentication time
 - ◆ example: process (running under a user ID)

Reference monitor




AC policies

- ◆ Goals
 - ◆ Check every access
 - ◆ Enforce least privilege
 - ◆ Verify acceptable usage
- ◆ Track users' access
- ◆ Enforce at appropriate granularity
- ◆ Use audit logging to track accesses

Implementing AC policies

- ◆ Reference monitor
- ◆ Access control directory
- ◆ Access control matrix
- ◆ Access control list
- ◆ Privilege list
- ◆ Capability
- ◆ Procedure-oriented access control
- ◆ Role-based access control


Access control directory



Access control matrix

	BIBLIOG	TEMP	F	HELP.TXT	C_COMP	LINKER	SYS_CLOCK	PRINTER
USER A	ORW	ORW	ORW	R	X	X	R	W
USER B	R	-	-	R	X	X	R	W
USER S	RW	-	R	R	X	X	R	W
USER T	-	-	-	R	X	X	R	W
SYS_MGR	-	-	-	RW	OX	OX	ORW	O
USER_SVCS	-	-	-	O	X	X	R	W

Access control list



Basic access control and information flow models

- ◆ Discretionary access control (DAC)
 - ◆ owner determines access rights
 - ◆ typically identity-based access control: access rights are assigned to users based on their identity
 - ◆ e.g., ACM
- ◆ Mandatory access control (MAC)
 - ◆ system enforce system-wide rules for access control
 - ◆ e.g., law allows a court to access driving records without the owners' permission

DAC

- ◆ In DAC the user (e.g., owner of resources/files) is responsible for deciding how information is accessed
- ◆ Local access decisions of users might conflict with each other
- ◆ Basic terms
 - ◆ Access control matrix
 - ◆ Security policy (specifying who has the access rights to what)
 - ◆ Security mechanism (enforce security policies)

DAC and MAC

- ◆ When is DAC insufficient?
 - ◆ when owner cannot be trusted for the discretion of the data and external protection of the data is necessary
 - ◆ e.g., DAC has the danger of right propagation
 - ◆ A can read X and write Y
 - ◆ B can read Y, but no access to X
 - ◆ A reads X, write the content of X to Y, B got access to X
- ◆ MAC
 - ◆ non-discretionary
 - ◆ labels are assigned to subjects and objects
 - ◆ owner has no special privileges
 - ◆ e.g., Bell-LaPadula, lattices models, SELinux by NSA

Traditional models for MAC

- ◆ Bell-LaPadula (BLP)
 - ◆ About confidentiality
- ◆ Biba
 - ◆ About integrity with static/dynamic levels

Bell-LaPadula security model

- ◆ The Bell-LaPadula (BLP) model is about information confidentiality
- ◆ It was developed to formalize the US Department of Defense multilevel security policy


Bell – LaPadula - details

- ◆ Each user subject and information object has a fixed security class – labels
- ◆ Use the notation \leq to indicate **dominance**
- ◆ Simple Security (ss) property:
 - no read-up property**
 - ◆ a subject s has read access to an object o iff the class of the subject $C(s)$ is greater than or equal to the class of the object $C(o)$
 - ◆ i.e. subjects s can read objects o iff $C(o) \leq C(s)$

Access control: Bell-LaPadula

Subjects

Objects



Access control: Bell-LaPadula

Subjects

Objects

Top Secret


Top Secret

Secret

Secret

Unclassified

Unclassified



Access control: Bell-LaPadula

Subjects

Objects

Top Secret

Top Secret

Secret

Secret

Unclassified

Unclassified

Read forbidden

Read forbidden

Read OK


Bell - LaPadula (2)

- ◆ * property (**star**):
the **no write-down** property
 - ◆ A subject s can **write** to object p if $C(s) \leq C(p)$

Access control: Bell-LaPadula

Subjects


Objects



Access control: Bell-LaPadula

Subjects

Objects



Access control: Bell-LaPadula

Subjects

Objects

Top Secret

Top Secret

Secret

Secret

Unclassified

Unclassified



Security models - Biba

- ◆ Based on the Cold War experiences, information *integrity* is also important, and the Biba model, complementary to Bell-LaPadula, is based on the flow of information where preserving integrity is critical.
- ◆ The “dual” of Bell-LaPadula


Integrity control: Biba

- ◆ Designed to preserve integrity, not limit access
- ◆ Three fundamental concepts:
 - ◆ Simple Integrity Property – no read down
 - ◆ Star Integrity Property (*) – no write up
 - ◆ No execute up

Integrity control: Biba

Subjects

Objects



Integrity control: Biba

Subjects

High Integrity

Medium Integrity

Low Integrity


Objects

High Integrity

Medium Integrity

Low Integrity






Source: XKCD

Operating System Layers

Many layers of abstraction:

- **Kernel:** core of the OS, controls hardware, resource access
 - Various subsystems (memory management, networking, storage, ...)
- Execution modes:
 - **user mode:** access to resources mediated by the kernel
 - **kernel mode:** full and direct access to resources



Processes

The kernel manages applications as processes (or threads)

Every process has:

- Process ID (PID)
- Virtual memory
- Effective user

Processes

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Every process has:

- Process ID (PID)
- Virtual memory
- Effective user

Kernel provides

- Separate address space from other process
- Time/resource sharing
- **Access control**

Processes

```
emplisi@ubuntu:~$ pstree
systemd├─ModemManager─2*[{ModemManager}]
      ├─NetworkManager─2*[{NetworkManager}]
      ├─VGAAuthService
      ├─accounts-daemon─2*[{accounts-daemon}]
      ├─acpid
      ├─anacron─sh─run-parts─mlocate─flock─updated
      ├─avahi-daemon─avahi-daemon
      ├─bluetoothd
      ├─boltd─2*[{boltd}]
      ├─colord─2*[{colord}]
      ├─cron
      ├─cups-browsed─2*[{cups-browsed}]
      ├─cupsd
      ├─dbus-daemon
      ├─firefox─3*[{Web Content─18*[{Web Content}]}]
              │   ├─Web Content─19*[{Web Content}]
              │   ├─WebExtensions─18*[{WebExtensions}]
              │   └─file:/// Content─18*[{file:/// Content}]
              │       └─59*[{firefox}]
      ├─fwupd─4*[{fwupd}]
      └─gdm3├─gdm-session-wor
            │   └─gdm-wayland-ses
            └─gnome-ses
```

Activity Monitor
My Processes

CPU Memory Energy Disk Network

Search

Process Name	Mem...	Threads	Ports	PID	User
Firefox	10.09 GB	162	1,387	3561	deemer
Virtual Machine Service	7.92 GB	24	83	35580	deemer
FirefoxCP Isolated Web Content	5.19 GB	39	158	3569	deemer
Docker	4.10 GB	42	333	32597	deemer
Microsoft PowerPoint	3.59 GB	42	13,784	3516	deemer
FirefoxCP Isolated Web Content	1.91 GB	33	140	3568	deemer
FirefoxCP Isolated Web Content	1.30 GB	32	136	3567	deemer
FirefoxCP Isolated Web Content	1.30 GB	33	139	3566	deemer
FirefoxCP Isolated Web Content	830.4 MB	29	114	6432	deemer
Preview	773.0 MB	6	1,713	11577	deemer
FirefoxCP Isolated Web Content	659.7 MB	29	115	66660	deemer
Open and Save Panel Service (Preview)	526.2 MB	4	2,596	11578	deemer
Terminal	519.3 MB	7	459	3476	deemer
Finder	457.7 MB	8	1,456	3292	deemer
Discord Helper (Renderer)	420.0 MB	40	805	11208	deemer
Docker Desktop	414.3 MB	29	7,939	32617	deemer
FirefoxCP Isolated Web Content	407.9 MB	29	113	63607	deemer
FirefoxCP Isolated Web Content	405.5 MB	32	137	3576	deemer

MEMORY PRESSURE



Physical Memory:	32.00 GB	App Memory:	9.95 GB
Memory Used:	28.48 GB	Wired Memory:	3.00 GB
Cached Files:	3.46 GB	Compressed:	14.92 GB
Swap Used:	8.80 GB		

View Processes in Linux

- **ps**: displays snapshot of running processes
 - **ps -ef** : show all processes
 - **ps -u <username>**: show processes for a user
- **top**, **htop**: fancier list of processes
 - **top -u <username>**: filter by username
- **kill <pid>**: terminates a process

```
metcalfe /u/ineyerov % ps -ef
UID      PID  PPID  C  STIME TTY          TIME CMD
root      1    0    0  2005 ?        00:00:01 init [2]
root      2    1    0  2005 ?        00:00:00 [ksoftirqd/0]
root      3    1    0  2005 ?        00:00:00 [events/0]
root      4    3    0  2005 ?        00:00:00 [khelper]
root     31    3    0  2005 ?        00:00:00 [kblockd/0]
root     104   33    0  2005 ?        00:00:01 [pdflush]
root     105   33    0  2005 ?        00:00:00 [pdflush]
root     107   33    0  2005 ?        00:00:00 [aio/0]
root     106    1    0  2005 ?        00:00:03 [kswapd0]
root     694    1    0  2005 ?        00:00:00 [kseriod]
root     745    3    0  2005 ?        00:00:00 [ata/0]
root     750    1    0  2005 ?        00:00:00 [scsi_eh_2]
root     751    1    0  2005 ?        00:00:00 [scsi_eh_3]
root     759    1    0  2005 ?        00:00:02 [kjournald]
root    1157    1    0  2005 ?        00:00:00 [khubd]
root    1263    1    0  2005 ?        00:00:00 [kjournald]
root    1264    1    0  2005 ?        00:00:00 [kjournald]
root    1265    1    0  2005 ?        00:00:00 [kjournald]
root    1266    1    0  2005 ?        00:00:06 [kjournald]
root    1521    1    0  2005 ?        00:00:00 [khsbpkt]
root    1584    1    0  2005 ?        00:00:00 [knodempd.0]
root    2813    1    0  2005 ?        00:00:00 dhclient -e -pf /var/run/dhclient
```

```
top - 14:23:25 up 41 days, 20:45, 10 users, load average: 0.02, 0.12, 0.19
Tasks: 142 total, 1 running, 140 sleeping, 0 stopped, 1 zombie
Cpu(s): 3.7% us, 0.7% sy, 0.0% ni, 95.7% id, 0.0% wa, 0.0% hi, 0.0% si
Mem: 1034436k total, 910324k used, 124112k free, 183132k buffers
Swap: 1046816k total, 4892k used, 1043924k free, 222260k cached
Which user (blank for all):
PID USER      PR  NI  VIRT  RES  SHR  S  %CPU  %MEM     TIME+  COMMAND
4104 root        5 -10 180m 506 6724  S   1.0   5.0    2:42.53  XFree86
13081 ineyerov   15  0 132m  72m 26m   S   1.0   7.2    17:22.58  mozilla-bin
21114 ineyerov  15  0 36876  17m 13m   S   1.0   1.7    0:01.38  kenapshot
24555 ineyerov  15  0 21128 7508 5460  S   0.7   0.7    0:00.79  artsd
21270 ineyerov 17  0 2035 1116  860  R   0.7   0.1    0:00.02  top
   1 root        16  0 1504  528 468  S   0.0   0.1    0:01.32  init
   2 root        35  19  0  0  0  S   0.0   0.0    0:00.28  ksoftirqd/0
   3 root        5 -10  0  0  0  S   0.0   0.0    0:00.85  events/0
   4 root        6 -10  0  0  0  S   0.0   0.0    0:00.00  khelper
  31 root        5 -10  0  0  0  S   0.0   0.0    0:00.61  kblockd/0
 104 root       15  0  0  0  0  S   0.0   0.0    0:01.81  pdflush
 105 root       15  0  0  0  0  S   0.0   0.0    0:00.32  pdflush
 107 root       15 -10  0  0  0  S   0.0   0.0    0:00.00  aio/0
 106 root       15  0  0  0  0  S   0.0   0.0    0:03.65  kswapd0
 694 root       25  0  0  0  0  S   0.0   0.0    0:00.00  kseriod
 745 root        6 -10  0  0  0  S   0.0   0.0    0:00.00  ata/0
 750 root       18  0  0  0  0  S   0.0   0.0    0:00.00  scsi_eh_2
```

Process Management

- Each process has a **context**, which includes the user, parent process, and address space
- Kernel enforces policies to decide which resources each processes can use

System calls (syscalls)

- Primary way processes interact with kernel
- OS provides a “library” of syscalls for nearly all OS functions
 - Files: read, write, open, close, chmod, ...
 - Process management: fork, clone, kill, ...
 - Networking: socket, bind, connect

On syscall, process “yields” to kernel, executes in **privileged** kernel mode

System services (daemons)

- Background process that performs common tasks
- Started at boot time
- Could run with higher permissions than users

Typical services:

- Remote SSH connections
- Web servers
- Logging

Identification and Authentication (recap)

- A subject should provide a **unique identifier**
- **Authentication** is the act of confirming the truth of an attribute of a datum or entity
- There are three authentication factors:
 - **Knowledge**: Something you know
 - **Ownership**: Something you have
 - **Inherence**: Something you are


Authorization

- Once a subject is Authenticated, access should be authorized
- **Authorization** is the function of specifying access rights to resources (**access control**)
- More formally, "to authorize" is to define access policy: permissions, rights, etc.

AAA and more...


Identification, **Authentication**, **Authorization**, **Accounting**, Auditing

– AAA Working Group, IETF



Authorization on the web

- Alice logs in (i.e. authenticates)
- The web server is now aware of who is logged in
- Alice attempts to access a course
- The application checks to see if Alice has the authorization for the course...
 - If so, Alice receives the requested information
 - If not, Alice has a denied access response
- Authorization could be just for reading or writing or execute (more in the future lectures)



AAA: Authentication, Authorization, Accounting

Authorization: how to specify access rights to resources

- To authorize => to define access policy

Users

- Each process is associated with a user
- Specific users can have more privileges than regular users
 - Install or remove programs
 - Change rights of other users
 - Modify the configuration of the system
- Unix: `root` is a “super-user” with no restrictions

Users


- Each process is associated with a user
- Specific users can have more privileges than regular users

- Unix: `root` is a “super-user” with no restrictions

How to we manage users?

Security Reference Monitor (SRM) (recap)

- Checks for proper authorization before granting access to objects.
- Object manager asks SRM if a Subject has the proper rights to execute a certain type of action on an Object.
- Implements auditing functions to keep track of attempts to access an object.



Discretionary Access Control (DAC)

- Users can protect what they **own**
 - The **owner** may grant access to others
 - The **owner** may define the type of access (read/write/execute) given to others
- DAC is the standard model used in operating systems
- Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
 - Multiple levels of security for users and documents (i.e. confidential, restricted, secret, top secret)
 - A user can create documents with just his level of security

General Principles

- Files and folders are managed by the operating system
- Applications, including shells, access files through an API
- Access control entry (**ACE**)
 - Allow/deny a certain type of access to a file/folder by user/group
- Access control list (**ACL**)
 - Collection of ACEs for a file/folder
- A **file handle** provides an opaque identifier for a file/folder
- File operations
 - Open file: returns file handle
 - Read/write/execute file
 - Close file: invalidates file handle
- Hierarchical file organization
 - Tree (Windows)
 - DAG (Linux)

Access Control Entries and Lists

- An **Access Control List** (ACL) for a resource (e.g., a file or folder) is a sorted list of zero or more **Access Control Entries** (ACEs)
- An ACE refers specifies that a certain set of accesses (e.g., read, execute and write) to the resources is allowed or denied for a user or group
- Examples of ACEs for folder “Bob’s CS166 Grades”
 - Bob; Read; Allow
 - TAs; Read; Allow
 - TWD; Read, Write; Allow
 - Bob; Write; Deny
 - TAs; Write; Allow

Closed vs. Open Policy

Closed policy

- Also called “default secure”
- Give Tom read access to “foo”
- Give Bob r/w access to “bar”
- Tom: I would like to read “foo”
 - Access allowed
- Tom: I would like to read “bar”
 - Access denied

Open Policy

- Deny Tom read access to “foo”
- Deny Bob r/w access to “bar”
- Tom: I would like to read “foo”
 - Access denied
- Tom: I would like to read “bar”
 - Access allowed

Question (1)

An ACL with no entries on a file?

- A. Access Allowed to all with Open Policy
Access Allowed to all with Closed Policy
- B. Access Denied to all with Open Policy
Access Allowed to all with Closed Policy
- C. Access Allowed to all with Open Policy
Access Denied to all with Closed Policy
- D. Access Denied to all Open Policy
Access Denied to all Closed Policy
- E. It is not possible to realize

Question (1) - Answer

An ACL with no entries on a file?

- A. Access Allowed to all with Open Policy
Access Allowed to all with Closed Policy
- B. Access Denied to all with Open Policy
Access Allowed to all with Closed Policy
- C. Access Allowed to all with Open Policy
Access Denied to all with Closed Policy
- D. Access Denied to all Open Policy
Access Denied to all Closed Policy
- E. It is not possible to realize

Closed Policy with Negative Authorizations and Deny Priority

- Give Tom r/w access to “bar”
- Deny Tom write access to “bar”
- Tom: I would like to read “bar”
 - Access allowed
- Tom: I would like to write “bar”
 - Access denied
- Policy is used by Windows to manage access control to the file system

Role-Based Access Control

- Within an organization **roles** are created for various job functions
- The permissions to perform certain operations are assigned to specific roles
- Users are assigned particular role, with which they acquire the computer authorizations
- Users are not assigned permissions directly, but only acquire them through their role



Access Control: File System

Linux vs. Windows

- Linux

- Allow-only ACEs
- Access to file depends on ACL of file and of all its ancestor folders
- Start at root of file system
- Traverse path of folders
- Each folder must have execute (cd) permission
- Different paths to same file not equivalent
- File's ACL must allow requested access

- Windows

- Allow and deny ACEs
- By default, deny ACEs precede allow ones
- Access to file depends only on file's ACL
- ACLs of ancestors ignored when access is requested
- Permissions set on a folder usually propagated to descendants (inheritance)
- System keeps track of inherited ACE's

Linux File Access Control


- File Access Control for:
 - Files
 - Directories
 - Therefore...
 - `\dev\` : *devices*
 - `\mnt\` : *mounted file systems*
 - What else? *Sockets, pipes, symbolic links...*

Unix Permissions

- Standard for all UNIXes
- Every file is owned by a user and has an associated group
- Permissions often displayed in compact 10-character notation
- To see permissions, use `ls -l`

```
jk@sphere:~/test$ ls -l
total 0
-rw-r----- 1 jk ugrad 0 2005-10-13 07:18 file1
-rwxrwxrwx 1 jk ugrad 0 2005-10-13 07:18 file2
```

Unix File Types and Basic Permissions



Permissions Examples (Regular Files)

<code>-rw-r—r--</code>	read/write for owner, read-only for everyone else
<code>-rw-r-----</code>	read/write for owner, read-only for group, forbidden to others
<code>-rwx-----</code>	read/write/execute for owner, forbidden to everyone else
<code>-r--r--r--</code>	read-only to everyone, including owner
<code>-rwxrwxrwx</code>	read/write/execute to everyone

Permissions for Directories

- Permissions bits interpreted differently for directories
- *Read* bit allows listing names of files in directory, but not their properties like size and permissions
- *Write* bit allows creating and deleting files within the directory
- *Execute* bit allows entering the directory and getting properties of files in the directory
- Lines for directories in `ls -l` output begin with `d`, as below:

```
jk@sphere:~/test$ ls -l
```

```
Total 4
```

```
drwxr-xr-x  2 jk ugrad 4096 2005-10-13 07:37 dir1
-rw-r--r--  1 jk ugrad   0 2005-10-13 07:18 file1
```

Permissions Examples (Directories)

<code>drwxr-xr-x</code>	all can enter and list the directory, only owner can add/delete files
<code>drwxrwx---</code>	full access to owner and group, forbidden to others
<code>drwx--x---</code>	full access to owner, group can access known filenames in directory, forbidden to others
<code>-rwxrwxrwx</code>	full access to everyone